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I. ABSTRACT
The problem of "creeping legalism," or incremental formalism, in
grievance arbitration cases has been a continuing refrain in legal literature;
however, until now empirical research concerning this problem has been
scant. This study provides the most comprehensive and thorough analysis to
date and supports the conclusion that legalization has continued to creep
upward from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. More specifically, this study
shows that there has been a statistically significant upward trend, with two
exceptions, for various factors including, elapsed time, charged days, and
post-hearing briefs. The two exceptions are the use of transcripts, which
remained constant until considerable up-and-down variation began in 1990,
and elapsed time during the hearing/post-hearing phase,. which maintained a
constant trend line for the entire twenty six year period. These results
demonstrate the need for more concerted efforts on the part of the parties,
arbitrators, and supporting organizations to rein in this trend, whether it is
creeping or galloping, to reach a balanced level of legalism to commensurate
with the maturation of the Braden model in the mid 1980s.
II. INTRODUCTION
After its impetus with the War Labor Board in the 1940s, grievance
arbitration matured and became institutionalized by the 1960s along the lines
of the model created by J. Noble Braden-a model based on Braden's view
of arbitration as a quasi-judicial or private-judge mechanism-rather than the
George Taylor model-a model based on the idea of arbitration as an
extension of collective bargaining.1
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Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Trends in Private Sector Grievance
Arbitration, in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 42, 44-47 (James L. Stem & Joyce M.
Najita eds., 1997) [hereinafter Trends]. See generally Richard Mittenthal, Whither
Arbitration?, in ARBITRATION 1991 THE CHANGES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (Gladys
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The original and continuing purpose of grievance arbitration has been to
provide an expedited and economical alternative to court proceedings. As
Alleyne observed: "Grievance hearings... [should] be swiftly reached and
swiftly conducted; nonlawyer representation for both sides... [should] be
the rule rather than the exception." 2 Yet, starting in the late 1950s, various
arbitrators observed, and warned against, creeping legalism.3 Several sources
continued the refrain during and after the maturation of the Braden model
with the primary themes being increasing delays, formalism, and costs. 4 In
fact, the problem of creeping legalism has not been a problem specific to the
W. Gruenberg ed., 1991), reprinted in ARB. J., Dec. 1991, at 24. (discussing the changes
in the field of arbitration with regard to the use of the Braden and Taylor models.)
2 Reginald Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 94
(1989).
3 E.g., Emanuel Stein, Arbitration and Industrial Jurisprudence, 81 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 866 (1958); Editorial, Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration, 13 ARB. J. 129
(1958); Benjamin Aaron, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 10 LAB. L.J. 605, 605-07
(1959).
4 E.g., Donald B. Straus, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics, 20 ARB. J. 197, 209
(1965); Harold W. Davey, What's Right and What's Wrong with Grievance Arbitration,
28 ARB. J. 209, 212 (1973); Harry E. Graham et al., Grievance Arbitration: Labor
Officials' Attitudes, 33 ARB. J., June 1978, at 21, 24; Robert Coulson, Satisfying the
Demands of the Employee, 31 LAB. L.J. 495, 496 (1980); Thomas A. Kochan, Empirical
Research on Labor Law: Lessons from Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, 1981 U.
ILL. L. REV. 161, 179 (1981); Peter Seitz, Delay: The Asp in the Bosom ofArbitration, 36
ARB. J., Sept. 1981, at 29; Winn Newman & Carole W. Wilson, Arbitration-As the
Parties See It: A Union Point of View, in ARBITRATION-PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 37, 43-44 (James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1984); Robben E.
Fleming, Reflections on Labor Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 1984: ABSENTEEISM,
RECENT LAW, PANELS, AND PUBLISHED DECISIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-
SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 11, 19 (Walter
Gershenfeld ed., 1985); Alleyne, supra note 2, at 94-106; David Alexander & Marcus
Widenor, Labor Perspective, in ARBITRATION 1992: IMPROVING ARBITRAL AND
ADVOCACY SKILL 273, 283 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1993). A former president of the
National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) referred to this "moumful dirge" as "galloping
legalism." William P. Murphy, Presidential Address: The Academy at Forty, in
ARBITRATION 1987, THE ACADEMY AT FORTY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 9 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1988).
For defense of the trend, see, for example, Sam Kagel, Legalism-and Some Comments
on Illegalisms-in Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 1985: LAW AND PRACTICE, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 180
(Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1986) [hereinafter ARBITRATION 1985]; J. David Andrews, A
Management Attorney's View, in ARBITRATION 1985, supra, at 191.
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United States; observers have pointed to the same trend in neighboring
Canada.5
The central issue revolves around the factor of elapsed time; to the extent
that a case takes longer from the filing of the grievance to the issuance of the
award, costs mount up in terms of the expense of the arbitrator, 6 the parties'
advocates, associated personnel (e.g., witnesses), and related documentation
(e.g., transcripts). In discipline and discharge cases, the expense is magnified
when the grievant succeeds in obtaining a monetary remedy, such as a back
pay award. An additional cost is the effect of delayed dispute resolution on
the morale of the workplace.7 In recognition of the importance of prompt
closure, the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-
Management Disputes ethically obligates arbitrators to avoid delay by timely
fulfilling present and future commitments, cooperating with parties to avoid
delays, and adhering to stipulated time limits for rendering an award. 8
5 E.g., Maureen F. Fitzgerald, Arbitration Is Okay, 43 LAB. L.J. 623 (1992); Kenneth
W. Thornicroft, Accounting for Delay in Grievance Arbitration, 44 LAB. L.J. 543, 546-
47 (1993); PAUL WEILER, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCEs: NEw DIRECnoNs IN CANADIAN
LABOUR LAW 110 (1980). Limited research confirms the existence of creeping legalism
in grievance arbitration in Canada. The primary study published (reflecting cases only in
Ontario) revealed a decline in the efficiency of labor arbitration from 1980-1990. Michel
G. Picher & Ellen E. Mole, The Problem of Delay at Arbitration: Myth and Reality, in
LABOUR ARBITRATION YEARBOOK 3, 39 (William Kaplan et al. eds., 1993).
6 Trends, supra note 1, at 54 (finding that arbitration charges (per diem multiplied by
charged days) increased 133%, in comparison to an inflation rate of 75.4%, between 1980
and 1993).
7See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960) ("The parties expect that... [the arbitrator's] judgment of a particular
grievance will reflect... [the contract's] consequence to the morale of the shop ...."';
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) ("The processing
of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of
the plant environment may be quite unaware." (citing Archibald Cox, Current Problems
in the Lm of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 247, 261 (1958))). Harking
back to the original purpose of arbitration, Joseph Rose hypothesized that delays in
grievance arbitration could result in wildcat strikes. Joseph B. Rose, Statutory Expedited
Grievance Arbitration: The Case of Ontario, ARB. J., Dec. 1986, at 30, 33, quoted in
Allen Ponak & Corliss Olson, The Delays in Grievance Arbitration, 47 REL.
INDUSTRIELLES 690, 691 (1992).
8 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-
MANAGEMENT DISPUTES § 2(J)(1)-(3) (American Arbitration Ass'n 1985) [hereinafter
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY], reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 447-58 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994).
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Other factors of undue legalism in arbitration proceedings include the
parties' use of lawyers, their insistence upon transcripts and post-hearing
briefs, and arbitrators' excessive citation of legal authorities in the awards.9
Several authors have advanced arguments both for and against the
increasing use of lawyers in labor arbitration.10 Similarly, while recognizing
the value of transcripts in complicated cases, commentators have observed
that transcripts contribute to both delays and increased costs.11
Acknowledging post-hearing briefs to be another contributing factor,
various arbitrator-authors have pointed to the parties themselves as
responsible for this trend. 12 Although briefs are sometimes helpful in
summarizing the facts and the parties' positions, 13 and the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires compliance with "mutual agreements in
respect to the filing or non-filing of post-hearing briefs," 14 nevertheless,
arbitrators could contribute to the alleviation of legalization by only granting
unilateral motions for filing of briefs when truly necessary. The few
commentators who have criticized the overuse of precedents point out that
stare decisis has limited applicability in arbitration as compared to
litigation. 15
9 Aaron, supra note 3, at 607-08; Anthony F. Bartlett, Labor Arbitration: The
Problem of Legalism, 62 OR. L. REv. 195, 205 (1983); Stein, supra note 3, at 866.
10 E.g., Aaron, supra note 3, at 607; Alleyne, supra note 2, at 94-96; Bartlett, supra
note 9, at 209; William Eaton, Labor Arbitration in the San Francisco Bay Area, 48 LAB.
ARB. REP. 1381, 1381 (1967); Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 633; Sylvester Garrett, Are
Lawyers Necessarily an Evil in Grievance Arbitration?, 8 UCLA L. REv. 535, 537-45
(1961); Kochan, supra note 4, at 179; Mittenthal, supra note 1, at 28.
11 E.g., Aaron, supra note 3, at 607-10; Bartlett, supra note 9, at 208; Seitz, supra
note 4, at 33-34.
12 E.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 632; Matthew M. Franckiewicz, An Arbitrator's
View of Writing Briefs, 54 DisP. RESOL. J., Feb. 1999, at 59, 60; James H. Jordan,
Comment to George Nicolau's Can the Labor Arbitration Process Be Simplified? If So, in
What Manner and at What Expense?, in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING
ROLES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, 92, 95 (Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1987);Trends, supra note 1, at 52-55;
Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration, 35 U. FLA. L. REv.
557, 623-24 (1983); Thornicroft, supra note 5, at 544.
13 Aaron, supra note 3, at 608; Seitz, supra note 4, at 33-34; Peter A. Veglahn,
Arbitration Costs/Time, 30 LAB. L.J. 49, 53 (1979).
14 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 8, § 6(A)(1).
15 Some commentators associate this "external law debate" with the process of
legalization. E.g., Aaron, supra note 3, at 608; Bartlett, supra note 9, at 204; Garrett,
supra note 10, at 541-42; Perry A. Zirkel, The Use of External Law in Labor Arbitration,
1985 DET. C.L. REV. 31, 41-43 (1985) [hereinafter External Law].
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A long held consensus among scholars in the legal community has been
that any upward trend in the above named factors, after the Braden model
reached maturation, 16 would signify unwarranted legalism. 17
The problem with this consensus, is its lack of grounding in terms of
empirical evidence, systematic longitudinal research. Most commentators
have made their evaluations based only on their experiences as arbitrators.
For example, Alleyne admitted that his primary conclusion about legalization
lacked "hard data."18 There is a limited amount of relevant analyses of hard
data (i.e. empirical research studies); however, these analyses are largely
non-longitudinal, 19 attitudinal,20 or peripheral.2 1
16 Although "maturation" in this context is not mathematically precise, it is a
reasonably reliable measure in relation to institutions and processes. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); Perry A. Zirkel & Katherine A. Pease, Beyond
Yeshiva: The Case for a Coordinated Approach to Faculty Bargaining, 11 STETSON L.
REv. 51 (1981).
17 Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 37 LAB.
L.J. 437, 439-40 (1986) (citing limited empirical data in AAA's former newsletter
STUDY TIME for support, their specific conclusion was "that labor and management have
just about reached the limits of legalism in the arbitration process.") [hereinafter The
Future]; Garrett, supra note 10, at 541; Richard S. Rubin et al., Creeping Legalism in
Public Sector Grievance Arbitration: An Empirical Approach, 27 J. COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 383, 386 (1998). Fitzgerald also acknowledged the problem,
but she identified Fleming as one of the few "produc[ing] statistics in this particular
area." Fitzgerald, supra note 5, at 631. However, Fleming's study is outdated and lacks
rigorous statistical analysis. See R. W. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 27,
37, 59 (1965).
18 Alleyne, supra note 2, at 96 n.13.
19See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation:
Reflections of a Judge, in ARBITRATION 1982: CONDUCT OF THE HEARING, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 16, 23
(James L. Stem and Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1983); Jordan, supra note 12, at 97; Rubin et
al., supra note 17, at 383; Straus, supra note 4, at 209; cf. Picher & Mole, supra note 5
(Ontario, Canada).
2 0 See, e.g., Alexander & Widenor, supra note 4; Arthur E. Berkeley, Arbitrators
and Advocates: The Consumers' Report, in ARBITRATION 1988: EMERGING ISSUES FOR
THE 1990s, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS 290, 297-98 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1989); Dallas L. Jones &
Russell A. Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration
Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1115, 1140 (1964); cf. Veglahn,
supra note 13 (attitudes and practices).
21 Some studies concerning characteristics of arbitrators include data on whether the
arbitrators were lawyers. However, they are non-longitudinal, and their wide variation in
not only sampling but also definitions precludes any valid trend analysis. See, e.g., James
P. Begin & Michael Zigarelli, 1994 National Academy of Arbitrators Research
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The studies that come closest to providing systematic, longitudinal
analysis of one or more of the characteristics of legalization are limited in
number and rigor.22 In 1990, Jack Stieber presented a longitudinal analysis of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) cases for the period
between 1963-1987.23 Corresponding elapsed time from filing to award data
from the American Arbitration Association (AAA) were also included, but
only for the years 1987 and 1988. Stieber's study was limited because of
missing data for one year, aggregation into five-year periods, and the absence
of sophisticated statistical techniques. In fact, Steiber himself cited the need
for "more and better statistics on elapsed time in grievance arbitration
cases." 24 Finally, summary reports in the AAA's former newsletter show an
upward trend with regard to party representation by attorneys, use of
transcripts, and frequency of post-hearing briefs. However, the total period
was only eight years, the data included overlaps and gaps, and the sampling
specifications were not uniform.25
Committee Membership Survey 2-5 (Apr. 1995) (unpublished document, on file with
author); Charles J. Coleman & Perry A. Zirkel, The Varied Portraits of the Labor
Arbitrator, in LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 19, 22-23 (Mario F. Bognanno &
Charles J. Coleman eds., 1992). Several studies concerning selection of arbitrators
included data on whether the parties consider a law degree an important attribute of an
arbitrator. See, e.g., Steven Stambaugh Briggs & John C. Anderson, An Empirical
Investigation of Arbitrator Acceptability, 19 INDUS. REL. 163, 169 (1980); Eric W.
Lawson, Jr., Arbitrator Acceptability: Factors Affecting Selection, 36 ARB. J., Dec. 1981,
at 22, 24; Richard P. Shore, Conceptions of Arbitrator's Role, 50 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
172, 177 (1966). Even less related, one study included whether arbitrators who were
attorneys had different compensation schedules than those who were not attorneys.
Donald J. Petersen & Julius Rezler, Fee Setting and Other Administrative Practices of
Labor Arbitrators: Study by Professors Petersen and Rezler of Loyola University of
Chicago, 68 LAB. ARB. REP. 1383, 1384-87 (1977).
22 Some sources include limited longitudinal data, but only as an incidental footnote.
E.g., Alleyne, supra note 2, at 95 n.12. Other sources provide comparisons based on a
very short durational period (two years). See, e.g., Trends, supra note 1, at 53-56; Nolan
& Abrams, supra note 12, at 624; Ponak & Olson, supra note 7, at 693; Arthur Ross, The
Well-Aged Arbitration Case, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 262 (1958); cf. Daniel F.
Jennings & A. Dale Allen, Jr., Labor Arbitration Costs and Case Loads: A Longitudinal
Analysis, 41 LAB. L.J. 80 (1990) (cost factors).
23 Jack Stieber et al., Elapsed Time in Grievance Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 1990,
NEw PERSPECTIVES ON OLD ISSUES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 128 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1991).
24 Id. at 141.
25 Issues of the AAA's quarterly newsletter,* STUDY TIME, provide the following data
for the period 1981-1989:
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II. METHOD
The purpose of this study is to determine whether there is an identifiable
upward trend in the various factors used to reflect the extent of legalism in
grievance arbitration cases. This study is based on the data provided by the
FMCS in its annual reports and in the unpublished annual statistics compiled
by its Office of Arbitration Services. 26 The specific variables include the
following:
1. Elapsed time
a. average duration of the pre-hearing phase 27
b. average duration of the hearing/post-hearing phase 28
c. total average duration (i.e., the sum of pre-hearing and hearing/post
hearing phases)
Period Start Period End Employer Union Rep. by Briefs Transcripts
Rep. by Attorney
Attorney
Sept. 1981 July 1982 70% 47% 48% 15%
May 1982 Oct. 1982 72% 48% 54% 14%
June 1983 July 1984 73% 51% 57% 18%
Aug. 1984 Aug. 1985 73% 52% 59% 21%
Jan. 1986 Dec. 1986 78% 54% 58% 22%
Jan. 1987 Oct. 1987 78% 56% 59% 20%
Oct. 1988 Jan. 1988 81% 54% 64% 22%
Jan. 1989 Oct. 1989 82% 54% 69% 23%
STUDY TIME, (A.B.A., New York, N.Y.), July 1982; STUDY TIME, (A.B.A., New'York,
N.Y.), Oct. 1984; STUDY TIME, (A.B.A., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 1986; STUDY TIME,
(A.B.A., New York, N.Y.), 199 7; STUDY TIME, (A.B.A., New York, N.Y.), 1988; STUDY
TIME, (A.B.A., New York, N.Y.), 1989.
26 Both sources provide data for elapsed time and charged time, but only the
unpublished annual statistics provide the data for transcripts and briefs. In addition, the
unpublished annual statistics have served as the primary basis for FMCS' annual reports.
In relatively limited cases there were discrepancies between the two overlapping sources
of the data for this study. For our resolution of each discrepancy, see infra notes 33-34.
For 1997 and 1998, the Office of Arbitration Services provided the data directly to the
authors inasmuch as these data are no longer compiled in its published or unpublished
annual statistics.
27 This phase consists of the following successive categories as defined by FMCS:
grievance filing until request for panel, panel request until panel sent, panel sent until
appointment of arbitrator, and appointment of arbitrator until hearing.
28 This phase amounts to the FMCS category reported in its annual reports as
"hearing until award rendered by arbitrator."
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2. Charged time
a. hearing
b. study
c. total days charged 29
3. Transcripts taken30
4. Briefs filed31
FMCS based its data for the variables in category one (elapsed time) on a
random sample of the arbitrator case reports, whereas its data for factors two
through four (charged time, transcripts taken, briefs filed) were based on all
arbitrator case reports that FMCS received. 32 In addition, the starting and
ending dates for each variable depended on the extent that the data were
available from FMCS.
We analyzed these data descriptively and inferentially. More specifically,
after a tabular summary for each factor, we have arranged the data
graphically in corresponding Figures. Each Figure corresponds to a
respective Table and demonstrates the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results
for each variable regressed against time, along with the value of the
coefficient of determination (r2). This coefficient is the most commonly used
measure of the goodness of fit of a regression line; it measures the proportion
of the total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the
regression model. The range for the coefficient of determination is from 0,
representing no fit, to 1.0, signifying a perfect fit. Finally, for inferential
purposes, a fourth Table reports the t-values for each estimated regression
slope coefficient, along with the designation of statistical significance for a
two-tailed hypothesis at the 0.05 and 0.01 level.
29 This sum includes not only hearing and study, but also travel time, as reported and
billed by arbitrators. We did not separately analyze travel time because it was relatively
limited and is not, compared with hearing and study time, related to legalization.
30 This variable is represented as a percentage (rather than average number) of cases
per year.
31 This variable is also reported as a percentage, where at least one party filed a
brief, according to the arbitrator's case report.
32 Due to a change in leadership, FMCS stopped collecting and compiling the
randomly sampled elapsed time data in 1997. Telephone conversation with Gary Hattal,
then Director of FMCS' Office of Arbitration Services (Feb. 3, 2000).
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IV. FINDINGS
Table 1 provides the average annual elapsed time for the pre-hearing and
hearing/post-hearing phases as well as their total.
Table 1. Average Elapsed Time
Year Pre-Hearing Phase33  Hearing/Post-Hearing Phase34  Total Days 35
1970 196.6 49.0 245.6
1971 203.8 47.1 250.9
1972 195.1 46.4 241.5
1973 208.4 48.7 257.1
1974 199.8 52.0 251.8
1975 180.6 42.6 223.2
1976 187.7 45.8 233.5
1977 216.1 52.2 268.3
1978 191.1 48.9 240.0
33 The elapsed time for the pre-hearing phase is the sum of the categories reported in
the unpublished annual statistics compiled by FMCS' Office of Arbitration Services for
1970-1996. See supra note 26. We found three discrepancies between the pre-hearing
phase numbers derived from this unpublished source and those published in FMCS'
annual reports. First and second, for 1988 and 1989 the pre-hearing phase numbers
published in FMCS' annual reports appear to be erroneous due to incorrect addition.
Third, FMCS' annual report for 1996 incorrectly listed the 1997 pre-hearing numbers, as
we discovered by summing the unpublished numbers for 1996. Thus, we resolved limited
discrepancies in favor of the unpublished annual statistics.
34 We derived the entries for the hearing/post-hearing phase from the unpublished
annual statistics. Specifically, each of these entries represents the difference between (1)
panel request until award rendered by arbitrator and (2) the sum of the three successive
subcategories-panel request until panel sent, panel sent until appointment of arbitrator,
and appointment of arbitrator until hearing. Again, we found some discrepancies between
the two sources of data. First, the annual reports erroneously listed the "hearing until
brief' numbers from the unpublished annual statistics as the hearing/post-hearing phase
for 1978-1987. Thus we used the unpublished data, per the aforementioned derivation
procedure, for the hearing/post-hearing phase. Second, starting in 1988, FMCS
introduced a new category in its unpublished annual statistics. This category is the time
elapsed from hearing until award, which matches the definition herein of the
hearing/post-hearing phase. However, for the period 1988-1996, the numbers for the
newly introduced category were close but not equal to the numbers derived from our
established procedure. After repeated consultations with the representatives of FMCS
failed to resolve the nature of this discrepancy, we relied on the unpublished data for the
sake of internal consistency.
35 The entries for "total days," which represent the sum of pre-hearing and
hearing/post-hearing phases, do not necessarily coincide with those published in FMCS'
annual reports due to the aforementioned discrepancies in the component categories. See
supra notes 32-33.
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1979 195.9 51.0 246.9
1980 191.5 52.2 243.8
1981 196.7 50.7 247.4
1982 253.0 65.5 318.5
1983 292.7 79.2 371.9
1984 276.4 77.8 354.2
1985 332.1 70.4 402.5
1986 279.7 65.7 345.4
1987 281.9 64.6 346.5
1988 224.5 50.6 275.1
1989 248:9 40.4 289.3
1990 261.7 49.4 311.1
1991 303.7 61.1 364.9
1992 249.7 67.0 316.6
1993 251.4 61.9 313.3
1994 266.0 60.4 326.4
1995 261.9 66.9 328.7
1996 244.5 57.5 302.0
1997 244.8 67.0 311.8
Table 1 reveals that despite considerable variation, for each of the elapsed
time variables, the trend tentatively appears to be upward. Table 2 presents
the annual averages for hearing, study, and total number of days charged.
Table 2. Average Number of Days Charged by Arbitrators
Year Hearing Study Total Days Charged
1970 0.92 1.66 2.93
1971 0.92 1.65 2.96
1972 0.91 1.69 2.96
1973 0.92 1.72 2.96
1974 0.93 1.73 3.00
1975 0.93 1.67 2.92
1976 0.89 1.67 2.88
1977 0.87 1.76 2.96
1978 0.99 1.78 3.08
1979 0.99 1.82 3.14
1980 1.00 1.88 3.21
1981 1.00 1.98 3.30
1982 1.01 2.01 3.37
1983 1.02 2.04 3.40
1984 1.04 2.04 3.41
1985 1.05 2.09 3.49
1986 1.04 2.08 3.48
1987 1.04 2.00 3.39
1988 1.11 2.15 3.64
1989 1.12 2.24 3.80
1990 1.11 2.29 3.79
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1991 1.06 2.27 3.70
1992 1.08 2.31 3.80
1993 1.14 2.33 3.84
1994 1.13 2.33 3.86
1995 1.20 2.33 3.94
1996 1.12 2.43 3.98
1997 1.13 2.33 3.86
1998 1.10 2.30 3.74
Table 2 also reflects an overall upward trend, with less variation than in
Table 1. Finally, Table 3 reports the percentage of cases in which transcripts
were taken and briefs were filed.
Table 3. Percentage of Cases with Briefs and Transcripts
Year Transcripts Taken Briefs Filed
1974 28.1% 43.4%
1975 27.7% 68.4%
1976 25.7% 67.2%
1977 23.8% 66.9%
1978 24.1% 65.7%
1979 24.9% 67.2%
1980 27.4% 70.0%
1981 29.3% 72.3%
1982 28.6% 73.7%
1983 28.1% 73.4%
1984 29.3% 74.3%
1985 29.9% 74.3%
1986 29.0% 75.0%
1987 29.6% 75.7%
1988 26.8% 75.6%
1989 30.0% 76.1%
1990 29.1% 76.0%
1991 19.6% 84.5%
1992 36.6% 94.4%
1993 10.4% 89.6%
1994 10.6% 94.2%
1995 9.5% 94.9%
1996 26.2% 70.2%
1997 29.0% 78.9%
1998 41.7% 77.0%
Table 3 suggests an up-and-down trend for transcripts, and a general, but
inconsistent, upward trend for briefs. Figure 1 depicts the plot of the fitted
linear trend along with the r 2 value for the annual average elapsed time for
each of the phases and their total.
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Figure 1. OLS and r2 Results for Annual Average Elapsed Time:
Pre-Hearing, Hearing/Post-Hearing Phases, and Total
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Figure 1 demonstrates that there is considerable variation for each of the
components and thus, for the total elapsed time. More specifically, each r2
value is comparatively small, reflecting a bad fit, especially in the case of the
hearing/post-hearing phase. Examination of the data points reveals that the
dispersion was particularly notable in the mid 1980s and that, although
largely parallel for each of the two component phases, the variation was
particularly pronounced for the hearing/post-hearing phase for the 1981-
1990 decade. Figure 2 contains the regression results for average days
charged by arbitrators in terms of hearing and study, and their total in terms
of time charged.
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Figure 2. OLS and r2 Results for Annual Average Days Charged by
Arbitrators: Study, Hearing, and Total
Hearingand Study
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Figure 2 reveals strongly consistent upward trends for all variables, with the
value of the coefficient of determination being close to .9. In light of the
upper boundary for the statistic, the linear time-trends explain a large portion
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of variation in each dependent variable. Figure 3 presents results derived
from a regression model for transcripts and briefs.
Figure 3. OLS and r2 Results for Percentage of Cases with
Briefs and Transcripts
Percent
100%
90% 0.54
60%
50%
40%/
301%
20%
10% =0.01"
0%
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 3992 1994 1996 1998
OTranscript taken Year
X Briefs f'ed
The regression line in Figure 3 exhibits an upward trend for briefs, with a
relatively good fit represented by a 2 value of 0.54. In contrast, the trend line
for transcripts has a negative slope with a very low value of the coefficient of
determination (r2 = 0.01), revealing a high degree of variation. Inspection of
the data points reveals that this variation is largely attributable to the period
since 1990. Table 4 provides the t values to determine whether each of the
fitted trend lines has a slope that is statistically different from zero (i.e.,
whether each individual factor changed significantly over time).
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Table 4. Values of t-statistic (t) for the Estimated Slope
Coefficients of OLS Linear Regression Models 36
Variable Period
Elapsed Time: 1970-1997
Pre-Hearing Phase 2.22 *
Hearing/Post Hearing Phase 1.65
Total Days 2.12 *
Days Charged: 1970-1998
Hearing 9.48 **
Study 10.60 **
Total Days Charged 7.16 **
Other: 1974-1998
Transcripts Taken -0.09
Briefs Filed 4.16 **
< 0.05
p< 0 .01
Table 4 reveals that all of the selected variables, except hearing/post-hearing
time and transcripts, have slopes that are statistically significant at least at the
0.05 level. Moreover, the variables in the category of annual average days
charged by arbitrators are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the
null hypothesis that each variable remained constant was rejected except for
hearing/post-hearing time and transcripts.
V. DISCUSSION
Based on the most comprehensive and thorough empirical analysis to
date, the conclusion is clear that, except for two exceptions, legalization has
continued to creep upward from the early 1970s to the late 1990s. Therefore,
contrary to Nolan and Abrams' prediction, the limits of legalism were not
reached in the 1980s.37 The first exception is the use of transcripts, which has
36 The Durbin-Watson d test revealed the presence of autocorrelation in all
regressions. To correct for autocorrelation, we used Cochrane-Orcutt iteration procedure,
which includes Preis-Winsten transformation, under the commonly accepted assumption
of the first-order autoregressive scheme, AR(1). The resulting corrected t-values are
generally acceptable, although caution is warranted because the sample sizes are not very
large.
37 The Future, supra note 17.
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remained largely constant since 1970, albeit with considerable up-and-down
variation since 1990. The second exception is for the hearing/post-hearing
phase, which reflected particular dispersion in the 1981-1990 decade;
although its trend line was not significantly upward or downward for the
entire twenty six year period, the other component and the total for elapsed
time was upward on a statistically significant basis.38 The goodness of fit and
the statistical significance for the other factors--days charged (study,
hearing, and, thus, total) and post-hearing briefs filed-provided stronger
evidence of an upward trend.
Unfortunately, corresponding systematic data for the other major
accepted factors of what has been alternatively termed "incremental
formalism"39-the use of attorneys to represent one or both parties-is not
available. The various studies that have included this variable are too widely
varied in sampling procedure to provide a coherent longitudinal picture.40
Moreover, the limited available research is inconclusive as to whether
the use of attorneys contributes to other indicia of legalism.4 1
38 "Generalizable" in this context refers to the high probability that the result for this
sample applies to the total population of grievance arbitration awards.
39 See Alleyne, supra note 2, at 106.
40 Moreover, the vast majority of these studies have found that the use of attorneys
as party representatives is not significantly related to which side wins. Compare Richard
N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact ofAttorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards,
40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 543, 553-54 (1987) (examining award tended to be more
favorable when either party was exclusively represented than when neither party was
represented by an attorney), and Perry A. Zirkel & Chad C. Miller, Grievance Arbitration
in K-12 Education Cases: Do Selected Case Characteristics Make A Difference, 28 J.
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUB. SECTOR 295, 300 (1999) (concluding that the
award tended to be more favorable when neither side was represented than when either
side exclusively was represented by an attorney), with Frank R. Annunziato, Grievance
Arbitration in Connecticut K-12 Public Education, 42 ARB. J., Sept. 1987, at 46, 51, and
Herbert Kritzer, "First Thing We Do, Let's Replace All the Lawyers": A Comparison of
Lawyers andNonlawyers as Advocates (1995) (working paper DPRP 11-9, University of
Wisconsin-Madison Law School Institute for Legal Studies), and Perry A. Zirkel, A
Profile of Grievance Arbitration Cases, 38 ARB. J., Mar. 1983, at 35, and Perry A. Zirkel
& Philip H. Breslin, Correlates of Grievance Arbitration Awards, 24 J. COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUB. SECTOR 45, 51-52 (1995). Similarly, the wide variation in
sampling and definitions in the non-longitudinal studies to date preclude a reliable
outcome-trend analysis of the related indicator, the use of arbitrators who are attorneys.
See Begin & Zigarelli, supra note 21; Coleman & Zirkel, supra note 21.
41 See Allen Ponak et al., Using Event History Analysis to Model Delay in
Grievance Arbitration, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 105, 119 (1996) (stating that only at
scheduling stage does legal counsel contribute to delay and the opposite is true at the
award stage); Stieber et al., supra note 23, at 137 (stating that attorney representation
with the presence of post-hearing briefs corresponds closely but does not increase elapsed
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The database for this study is not without limitations. For example,
FMCS is only one major source of arbitration awards; others are the AAA,
private panels, direct appointments, and state agencies. 42 Moreover, the
FMCS data are not free from imperfections. For example, in addition to the
identified soft spots,43 the response rate is less than complete.44 Nevertheless,
it is far superior to the alternatives, 45 because it is the most comprehensive
longitudinal database available, encompassing unpublished as well as
published awards, a broad range of sectors, and a national scope.
Similarly, the variability for the selected factors, particularly in recent
years, suggest the possible alternative of a second degree polynomial or
reciprocal regression model for the elapsed time. Utilizing these alternative
regression techniques allows for the possibility of a trend that has a
decreasing slope toward its end. However, no theory warrants the choice of a
particular functional form of the regression and for most of the factors the
linear regression produces a more fitting explanation.
With these caveats in mind, the specific findings of this study have both
practical as well as academic implications. Analyzing the trend of over-
judicialization, Bartlett speculated: "If this legalism could be quantified, the
outcry against this threat to the labor arbitration process might be more
widespread. '46 Perhaps the tentativeness of Bartlett's prediction is warranted;
time); Kenneth Thomicroft, Sources of Delay in Grievance Arbitration, 8 EMPLOYEE
RESPONSIBILITIES & RTS. J. 57 (1995) (significant source of elapsed time).
42 For the share of the total grievance cases in 1986 for each source, see Charles J.
Coleman, The Arbitrator's Cases: Number, Sources, Issues, and Implications, in LABOR
ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 85, 94 (Mario F. Bognanno & Charles J. Coleman eds., 1992).
According to Coleman's estimate, private panels accounted for the highest number of
cases for 1986, followed by FMCS. Id. at 93. Nolan and Abrams reported that permanent
umpireships have declined in favor of private panels, and they listed the National
Mediation Board as a limited, additional source of cases. Trends, supra note 1, at 57, 68
43 See supra notes 33-34. Such seeming glitches may be attributable to changes in
personnel, practice, or policy. For example, the recent policy change to a fee for
participating in the FMCS arbitral appointment system may cause variation in future
longitudinal studies. A new era was marked in 1998 with notable changes in the number
of panel requests and arbitrator appointments. Walt Gershenfeld, The FMCS Numbers,
CHRON., Winter 2000, at 20.
44 Trends, supra note 1, at 70. On the other hand, the FMCS case activity reports are
integrated in the arbitrator's billing form, thus enhancing the probabilities of return.
45 For example, AAA discontinued the systematic collection of case activity reports
years ago and only recently re-established a research function. Correspondence between
Richard Naimark, Vice-President AAA, and author (Mar.-July 1999) (on file with
author).
46 Bartlett, supra note 9, at 226 n.151.
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the problem is that, as with grade inflation,47 the various constituencies not
only contribute to but also benefit from this trend in terms of self-interest.48
Nevertheless, although we may be another vox clamantis in deserto,4 9 we
interpret these findings in resounding resonance with grievance arbitration's
institutional interest in being distinctively expedited and economical.
The overall findings are not defensible in terms of "moth-eaten
rationalizations," 50 such as the choice of the Braden model rather than the
Taylor model, the reciprocal finger-pointing between the arbitrators and the
parties, and the requirements of external law. The Braden model had ample
time to reach maturation51 by the 1980s. 52 Similarly, the responsibility of
arbitrators and party representatives are mutual, not mutually exclusive.
Although Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.53 and other case law has caused
the need for transcripts or other measures of formality,54 their effect has been
limited both in scope and time.55
47 See Perry A. Zirkel, Grade' Inflation: A Leadership Opportunity for Schools of
Education?, 101 TCHRs. C. REC. 247, 255 (1999) (discussing grade inflation and the
problems that surround it).
48 For example, it is in the interest of the arbitrator not to decline appointments to
cases, rather than defer them to a later date, due to a busy schedule and to risk alienating
either party by running counter to the norm with regard to other delay- and cost-reduction
techniques. It is similarly in the interest of the lawyer-representative to use transcripts,
post-hearing briefs, and extended scheduling.
49 See, e.g., William P. Murphy, Academy History: Highlights and Sidelights, in
ARBITRATION 1997 THE NExT FIFTY YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL
MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 30, 40 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1998)
[hereinafter ARBrrRATION 1997] ("Well, perhaps Eva [Robins] and others who share her
view are shouting against the wind, but who knows?").
50 Davey, supra note 4, at 223.
51 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., The Future, supra note 17.
53 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co, 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974).
54 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 9, at 210-25; cf. Theodore St. Antoine, The Law of
Arbitration, in LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 1, 22-26 (James L. Stem & Joyce M.
Najita eds., 1997).
55 See, e.g., Charles J. Coleman, Invited Paper: Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory
Issues: in Austin, Wright and the Future, in ARBITRATION 1998: THE CHANGING WORLD
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFrY-FIRST MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 134, 148 (Steven Briggs & Jay E. Grenig eds., 1999);
Cornell Survey Results Aired at Montreal, CHRON., Summer 2000, at 6; Michelle
Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances in the
Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, 39 ARB. J., Sept. 1984, at 49, 55 (discussing the effect of
Gardner-Denver on parties seeking review of arbitration discussions); External Law,
supra note 15, at 41-43.
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As for the specific findings, the significant upward trend for total elapsed
time is troubling in terms of the age-old axiom about justice delayed being
justice denied.56 Although largely, if not entirely, attributable to the pre-
hearing phase, where increasing involvement of lawyers may be a primary
contributing factor, the parties and the arbitrator cannot deny a significant
share of the responsibility. The parties decide on the use of lawyers and, with
or without, legal representation, can put a priority on prompt scheduling.57
Arbitrators, even in cases scheduled by outside agencies, similarly may push
the parties and themselves for earlier and firmer hearing dates.
Even the more significantly upward trend for days billed is subject to
mitigation by the arbitrators and the parties. Arbitrators could limit hearings
to one day more often58 by insisting on it from their initial words and
actions 59-placing serious emphasis on concise opening statements,
parsimonious objections, efficient stipulations, non-redundant testimony, and
staying until closure. 60 Similarly, arbitrators should take the offensive, rather
than the defensive, in relation to the statistically significant upward slope of
charged study days. Part of the answer appears to be keeping hearing days to
a minimum. However, another part is being more efficient about study days;
the ratio between study and hearing days has increased from consistently less
than 2:1 to generally more than 2:1 since the mid 1980s. 61 Conversely, the
parties have an obvious role in escalating or mitigating the charged hearing
and study day by providing more than lip service to controlling these key
costs of arbitration.
The similarly statistically significant upward trend line for the filing of
post-hearing briefs is clearly within the control of the parties and subject to
56 This application of this aphorism is not new to us. See Newman & Wilson, supra
note 4, at 42; Thornicroft, supra note 5, at 543.
57 Ponak & Olson, supra note 7, at 703 (suggesting that delays could be significantly
delayed by adopting and adhering to more expeditious procedures for selecting arbitrators
and scheduling hearings).
58 It is indeed surprising, to some observers at least, that the hearings averaged less
than one billed day until 1980. See supra tbl.2.
59 "Initial" in this context includes pre-hearing communications to both parties, even
where AAA, FMCS, or another such agency is the intermediary.
60 In the senior author's experience, which encompasses more than twenty years as a
labor arbitrator, albeit on a part-time basis, when the parties know that the arbitrator
"means business" about keeping the hearing to one day, by starting early or staying into
the evening hours if necessary, in most cases the hearing is completed without having to
resort to either of these announced alternatives.
61 See supra tbl.2.
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arbitral passivity or activism. 62 Although opining that "the process would be
greatly improved if the filing of briefs were confined to the few cases of
exceptional complexity" and observing that "I cannot recall a case in which
the brief was decisive," former National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA)
president William Murphy predicted that the prevailing trend would
continue.63 His prophecy may be correct, but it is, at least in part, self-
fulfilling. He explained that he does not provide the parties with his view
unless asked; yet, we suggest that being bold enough to serve as an active
conscience to the parties of the economical and expedited raison d'etre of
grievance arbitration can dampen, if not reverse, the trend. The parties must
play the primary role in preparing an effective closing argument and making
post-hearing briefs the clear exception rather than the increasing rule.
Murphy is probably right in pointing the finger at management lawyers,
"attuned by tradition and billable hours to the filing of briefs," as the lead
players, 6,4 but the employer-client, their union counterparts, and even the
arbitration literature also play contributing roles.
Although we found that the use of transcripts did not experience a
significant upward trend, they did not, contrary to the conclusion of Nolan
62 For example, in responding to a one-sided request for post-hearing briefs, one
leading arbitrator described his controversial but useful technique of offering the
opposing party the option of presenting closing arguments ex parte. I. B. Helburn, The
End Is Near: A Note on Effective Closure, in ARBITRATION 1997, supra note 49, at 272,
273.
63 William P. Murphy, The Ten Commandments for Advocates How Advocates can
improve the Labor Arbitration Process, in ARBITRATION 1992: IMPROVING ARBITRATION
ADVOCACY SKILLS PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 253, 261 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1993); see Jennings &
Allen, supra note 22, at 85 (showing that 63% of 1987 NAA sample, as compared to 44%
of 1975 NAA sample, favored elimination of post-hearing briefs as a cost-reduction
technique); Joseph Brandschain, Preparation and Trial of a Labor Arbitration Case, in
ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 125, 154 (Noel Levin et al. eds., 1974) (declaring that the
filing of briefs is "often merely a wasteful delaying tactic"); Franckiewicz, supra note 12,
at 60-61 (estimating that "more than 95% of post-hearing briefs make no difference to
the outcome" but they have become "the default method of closing argument in labor
arbitration"). Seitz, supra note 4, at 34, went a step further by questioning the prevailing
assumption that the parties have a "right" to file post-hearing briefs.
64 Murphy, supra note 63. Indeed, in his reply to Murphy's presentation,
management attorney Robert J. Berghel insisted that briefs will be even more the norm in
the future. Robert J. Berghel, Management Perspective, in ARBITRATION 1992:
IMPROVING ARBITRATION AND ADVOCACY SKILLS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 267, 272 (Gladys W. Grunchbag
ed., 1993). The primary basis for his argument was Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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and Abrams' more limited analysis, "declinef dramatically." 65 The
explanation is not solely economic, 66 for the other factors, such as post-
hearing briefs and billed days, are also expensive. Those who practice as well
as profess techniques to halt the trend toward creeping legalism 67 are likely
to view this result as a positive sign, but the generally obverse valence of the
other factors suggest a more complex explanation, which would benefit from
further research.
The recommendation for more research suggests the need for more
precise questions and more refined measurements.68 The recent re-
establishment of a research arm at AAA 69 is a promising sign but the results
will depend upon resources, focus, and leadership. The recent changes in the
leadership of FMCS's Office of Arbitration Services may represent a step
forward or backward in terms of relevant research and action. Finally, the
NAA can continue to play an influential role in exposing and evaluating
pertinent policy issues70 and institutional solutions.71
65 Trends, supra note 1, at 53. They used only two years, 1980 and 1994, thus
missing the trend of a longer and more complete set of data points. Similarly, revealing
the problem of relying solely on individual experience, Murphy, characterized the trend
as downward. Murphy, supra note 63, at 261.
66 To the extent that it is economic, one Union representative explained the rationale
with aplomb:
[P]eople forget the "E"for Economy in arbitration: union advocates are paid usually
by the year; arbitrators are paid by the day; employer's counsel are paid by the hour;
and court reporters are paid by the page! Where would you start if you wanted to
save money?
Shawn C. Keenan, Union Perspective, in ARBITRATION 1996 AT THE CROSSROADS:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS 114, 119 (Joyce M. Najita ed., 1997).
67 For example, responding to one-sided requests for the use of a transcript, an
experienced arbitrator suggested the technique of refusing to accept a copy unless one is
given to the opposing side, gratis. Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Selected Problems of Procedure
and Evidence, in ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 48, 61 (Arnold M. Zack ed., 1984).
68 For example, Alleyne, supra note 2, at 94, hypothesized that elapsed time may be
inversely related to case complexity, but the "ambiguous" findings by Ponak suggest the
need for caution in hypotheses about and measures of complexity. Ponak et al., supra
note 41, at 117.
69 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
70 For example, recent NAA president Rubin raised the question of whether the
Academy inadvertently extended the creep of legalism by adopting the Protocol and the
Guidelines for employer-promulgated grievance arbitration. Milton Rubin, Presidential
Address Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going? Do We Know?, in ARBITRATION
1998 THE CHANGING WORLD OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-FIRST
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 6-7 (Steven Biggs & Jay E.
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The choices, as Nicolau eloquently elaborated, are a trade-off.72 Now
that the problem is at least preponderantly proven and the remedies are
amply available, 73 it is left to the arbitrators, the parties, and the supporting
organizations to demonstrate the requisite concerted commitment.74 In his
response to Nicolau's suggested solutions, labor attorney Tom Jennings
addressed all sides-including arbitrators-with this fitting conclusion: "It
does no good to bemoan the negative effect of excess adversarial exuberance,
needless witnesses, and useless briefs and transcripts unless one is willing to
do something about it."'75
Grenig eds., 1999). In doing so, he recommended reexamination of this issue: "Should
arbitrators be the captives of the parties who decide on the format of proceedings at the
cost ofjettisoning the basic identifying principles-speed, economy, and justice?" Id. at 8.
71 For example, Alleyne proposed a set of simplified rules of evidence to counter the
trend toward over-judicialization. Alleyne, supra note 2. For other examples, see supra
notes 57, 60, 62, and 67.
72 George Nicolau, Can the Labor Arbitration Process Be Simplified? If So, in What
Manner and at What Expense, in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING ROLES
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THRTY-NINTH MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 69
(Walter J. Gershenfeld ed., 1987). Conversely, incremental formality, like inflation,
comes at a price. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 1, at 62. Part of the price, according to one
limited study at least, is that as formality increases, the willingness to arbitrate decreases.
Rubin et al., supra note 17, at 389.
73 The alternatives, such as grievance mediation and med-arb, are also ample,
though they have not flourished. See Matthew T. Roberts et al., Grievance Mediation: A
Management Perspective, 45 ARB. J., Sept. 1990, at 15, 15 (stating that less than 4% of
labor contracts in private sector provide for grievance mediation). Nor has "expedited
arbitration," which Murphy, supra note 4, at 9, pointed out, is an ironic term. For
Canadian initiatives in expedited arbitration, see John Sanderson et al., Expediting the
Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 1999: Quo VADIS? THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 80 (Jay E. Grenig & Steven Briggs eds., 2000).
7 4 The results of surveys to date of labor and management advocates as to the extent
of commitment are ambiguous in light of the limited response rate and the confusing item
construction. See Arthur Eliot Berkeley, The Most Serious Faults in Labor-Management
Arbitration Today and What Can Be Done to Remedy Them, 40 LAB. L.J. 728, 728
(1989); Veglahn, supra note 13, at 50. In any event, the action-or in this case, the
inaction-has spoken louder than the words.
75 Nicolau, supra note 72, at 91.

